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The Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW) will replace selected M16 
rifles and M4 Carbines in combat and combat support organizations in the U. S. Army.  
The OICW is envisioned to be a lightweight, shoulder-fired weapon having a dual 
munitions capability and an advanced day/night fire control.  The OICW is expected to 
provide substantial improvements in lethality over the predecessor rifle and carbine 
families of weapons.  The Office of the Program Manager for Small Arms assessed the 
OICW Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) Process and program progress in 
1998 and concluded that the process did not prepare the program for Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) as originally planned and that the ATD exit criteria 
and the Operational Requirements Document threshold requirements were too far apart to 
allow entrance into EMD.  Despite the decision to transition the program to Program 
Definition and Risk Reduction, the ATD process did not accomplish the actions that were 
necessary to reduce cost, schedule and performance risk to the program.  This thesis 
examines how the acquisition process could be improved to better improve subsequent 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
[The] OICW failed to meet key effectiveness and suitability ATD exit 
criteria in Government testing during the fall of 1999.  The most important of 
these criteria were probability of incapacitation (Pi), weight, and safety.  These 
three areas are considered high risk and will require aggressive risk reduction 
measures during the Program Definition Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase [SER 
2000].   
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to examine the efficacy of the OICW ATD in 
preparing the system for transition to an acquisition program. The goal is to provide an 
analysis and lessons learned of the ATD approach to developing technologically 
advanced weapon systems and transition to program management.  
B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The scope of this research is limited to include: (1) A review of U.S. infantry 
weapons procurement leading to the OICW, (2) a review of the requirements for the 
system, (3) a review of the technology transfer mechanisms used to initiate programs and 
(4) an analysis of the OICW ATD effectiveness compared to commercial and business 
practices for research and development of new technology and corresponding lessons 
learned.  The research is limited to addressing the system’s Operational Requirements 
Document’s Key Performance Parameters.   
The thesis uses a case study methodology.  This research topic is concerned with 
the processes of managing a weapon system program incorporating significant 
technology.  By examining key aspects of this acquisition program within the context of 
DoD acquisition practices, and comparing those practices to the commercial sector’s we 
may elicit lessons as to why the OICW ATD has been characterized as failing in its goal 





C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What processes could have been implemented to improve the ATD-to-PMO 
transition for the OICW? 
Subsidiary questions:   
What is the background of the OICW system and why is it required? 
What are the requirements for the system? 
What is the purpose of an Advanced Technology Demonstration? 
What are the challenges and issues in ATD transition to PMO? 
How effective was the ATD in developing the OICW for transition? 
What lessons learned are applicable to this study? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology consisted of conducting a literature search of books, journal 
articles, and library information resources on the history of small arms development in 
the U.S.  To provide an understanding of the need for the OICW, I conducted a thorough 
review including, but not limited to: user requirements for the system, the acquisition 
strategy, the contract with the prime integrator, the System Evaluation Report issued by 
the Army Test and Evaluation Command and the Joint Service Small Arms Plan.  To 
demonstrate the processes of technology transfer, I conducted a review of the ATD 
process and the specific ATD for the OICW.  To demonstrate the issues surrounding the 
transition from ATD to program, I compared lessons learned from previous weapon 
system programs, as summarized in GAO reports, to the expected outcome of the OICW 
program.   
E. ORGANIZATION 
The thesis is divided into five chapters: 
Chapter II provides a background of small arms development in the U.S. to 
demonstrate common themes with the OICW program.   
Chapter III identifies and discusses problems and issues involved with the OICW 





Chapter IV provides an analysis of the ATD transition and presents lessons 
learned based on a comparison of business practices in the development of, and 
integration of new technology from previous weapon system programs.   
Chapter V presents conclusions and recommendations based on lessons learned 
that are applicable to the OICW and future objective weapon programs. 
F. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis identifies lessons learned from the OICW program and other weapon 
system programs.  These lessons learned will assist program managers, by demonstrating 
measures to identify risk through timely insertion of technology into weapon system 
programs.  Ultimately, this information may lead to weapon programs that espouse less 





























II. BACKGROUND--HISTORY OF SMALL ARMS DEVELOPMENT 
LEADING TO THE OICW 
A. INFANTRY RIFLE PROCUREMENT FROM 1946  
Since the end of World War II, the United States Army has been seeking 
a better infantry weapon.  The quest for a new rifle has often been filled with 
frustrations and failures.  As a consequence of unrealistic military requirements, 
poor management, disputes within NATO, and congressional stinginess, it took 
twelve years to develop and replacement for the M1 rifle.  [EZELL 1984]   
 
B. LIGHTWEIGHT RIFLE PROGRAM 
The M14 rifle was the product of the lightweight rifle (LWR) program and 
replaced the M1 as the infantryman’s primary weapon.  The LWR program (1945-1961) 
was marked by an absence of a sense of urgency and emphasis.  As a result in 
manufacturing problems, delays, and the failure of the weapons design in controlled 
automatic fire, the Department of Defense (DoD) ceased funding production of the M14 
in 1962. 
C. SPECIAL PURPOSE INDIVIDUAL RIFLE PROGRAM 
In 1963, the DoD announced the 
purchase of the AR15 as an interim measure.  
Meanwhile, the follow-on to the LWR was 
the Special Purpose Individual Weapon 
(SPIW) program.  This effort pursued the 
possibility of a small caliber “flechette”1 
round for use in a military rifle.  After 
extensive development and testing, no SPIW 
prototypes could attain reliability, durability 
and weight requirements.  In 1966, the Army 
Figure 2-1, Prototype SPIWS 
From top: Springfield Armory, AAI Corp (2) 





                                                 
1 Flechette- a projectile fired from a rifle in the form of a thin, lightweight, fin-stabilized steel dart.   
Chief of Staff announced the M16 would be adopted as the standard infantry rifle and the 
SPIW program was to become part of a wider R&D effort to develop a follow-on weapon 
to the M16.   
The AR15/M16 was a departure from the historic method of rifle development in 
the United States since 1794—it was the first completely commercial rifle research and 
development (R&D) venture adopted by the services. [EZELL 1984]  This newer weapon 
was rushed through the testing and evaluation process so that it could be placed in the 
hands of troops fighting in Vietnam.  The rifle’s appeal was due to the same features 
sought after in the lightweight rifle program—lightweight, controllable at full automatic 
fire, short length, accurate and effective.  However, as a result of hurried development, 
and the hasty and inadequate training provided to deployed troops, life threatening 
malfunctions emerged, lending a poor reputation to the rifle.   
Due to the perceived inadequacies of the M16, the Army developed 
improvements to the design that addressed the concerns of troops in the field.  This led to 
the improved M16A1 rifle.  The changes included enhancements to improve reliability.  
Although the standard infantry weapon, the M16 was still essentially an interim weapon.   
By 1970, other NATO countries were beginning to make noises about 
standardizing a new rifle caliber cartridge.  Placed in a position of defending the 
5.56mm cartridge, the United States military was not yet ready to propose a type 
of ammunition as radical as the flechette round2.  One Defense official expressed 
a more cynical view.  He stated that “the SPIW program, unfortunately, was not 
a weapon; it was a political tactic to head off possible major purchases of the 
M16. [EZELL 1984]    
The decade between 1973 and 1983 saw little in the way of progress towards the 
development of a new infantry weapon.  The U.S. Army Combat Developments 
Command issued a materiel need document (MND) for a future rifle system to allow a 
25% increase in effectiveness over the current M16A1.  The program was based on a 
concept of firing multiple projectiles from a single cartridge.  This program failed to 





2 In the late 1950s, the U.S. defeated a British attempt to standardize infantry cartridges around a well-
developed 7mm medium power cartridge, claiming is diminutive aspects not suited to U.S. infantry 
requirements.  At the time the T25 and T44 development rifles (precursors to the M14) were in 
development in the U.S. and both were designed around a full power 7.62mm cartridge.  NATO countries 
dropped the medium cartridge effort and soon followed suit, adopting the 7.62mm cartridge.  After the 
demise of the M14 program, the U.S. defaulted to a 5.56mm cartridge, even smaller than the original 
British suggestion.  This put the U.S. in an awkward position having now adopted the M16 as the 
“standard”. 
develop a reliable product that met requirements.  As with the SPIW program, the future 
rifle system’s MND was rescinded and the R&D activities were reoriented to examine 
conceptual approaches to the development of new technology for future small arms 
systems. 
Concurrently and as a result of NATO 
munitions standardization, requirements developed by 
the Marine Corps and the United States Army Infantry 
Center, Ft Benning, GA (USAIC) led to the 
development of the M16A2.  M16A2 improvements 
included a redesigned barrel to support firing a heavier 
projectile, improved sights and integral provisions for 
left-handed firers.  Due to munitions and weapon 
enhancements, the rifle’s range increased to 800 meters 
from 300 meters.   
Figure 2-2 Prototype ACRs 
From Top: AAI Corp, Colt Ind., Heckler and 
Koch [After   Hogg as cited in Velleux, 2001] 
D. ADVANCED COMBAT RIFLE PROGRAM 
In 1984, the Army instituted the advanced combat rifle (ACR) program.  This 
research effort was a technology search to incorporate improved sighting systems, 
multiple projectile rounds, and use of caseless ammunition.3  The ACR program 
developed several weapon prototypes, none of which where appreciably better than the 
M16A2 in testing.   
E. OBJECTIVE INDIVIDUAL COMBAT WEAPON PROGRAM 
The OICW program was instituted in 1994 after the Advanced Combat Rifle 
program failed to produce a next generation rifle that was appreciably improved over the 










                                                 
3 Caseless ammunition does not use a metallic cartridge case to contain propellant.   
The OICW will be a dual weapon system that combines air-bursting 
munitions, secondary kinetic energy munitions, a full solution fire control (that 
contains a laser range finder with beam steering, computer, thermal, TV and 
direct view optics modes, environmental sensors, electronic compass with 
vertical angle measurement, target tracker, combat identification, and a laser 
pointer to affect decisively violent and suppressive target effects.  It will include 
embedded/appended training and embedded diagnostics, and be interoperable 
with Land Warrior [TEMP 2000].  
 
After having completed the Concept Exploration (CE) phase in 1999 concluding in an Advanced 
Technology Demonstration (ATD) of engineering prototypes, the OICW is now in the Program Definition 
and Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase of the program.   
 The Office the PM Small Arms (OPMSA) awarded a contract to Alliant 
TechSystems (ATK) for the PDRR phase of 
the OICW program.  The purpose of this 
phase was to develop a near-final system 
design that will enable the Product Manager 
(PM) Small Arms to enter into Engineering 
and Manufacturing Development (EMD) 
with acceptable risk of meeting the required 
system performance, cost and schedule.  
Figure 2-3, An ATD prototype OICW 
F. TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION MECHANISMS 
The Army’s goal for science and technology (S&T) is to demonstrate 
timely and affordable weapon system concepts through Government and private 
industry to maintain land warfare supremacy.  The Army’s vision for S&T is the 
“early retirement of risk in materiel development programs” [DA Pam 70-3, 
1988] 
 
The transition point from the demonstration of technology into a formal 
acquisition program for a new system occurs at Milestone I when a program begins the 
PDRR phase. This occurs after a validated need has been approved at Milestone 0, and 
ideally, when technologies critical to performance have been proven. This action requires 
coordination of the S&T developer, the systems manager (User representative)/PM 
(MATDEV), and the combat developer (CBTDEV). Prior to transition from S&T, the 





• The technologies have been demonstrated, thoroughly tested, and shown to be 
predicable. 
• There is a clear and verified military need for the new capability system or 
system upgrade. 
• The new capability system is cost effective. 
 1. The Advanced Technology Demonstration  
An Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) brings the CBTDEV, 
MATDEV, and industry together to explore the technical feasibility, affordability, and 
potential of technologies to support current and emerging warfighting concepts [DA Pam 
70-3].    
ATDs help speed the introduction of advanced technologies needed to develop 
future systems and allow experimentation with technology-driven operational issues.  
The goal is to provide a better understanding of capabilities versus technology, resulting 
in a more informed requirements document prior to a Milestone I decision.  ATDs allow 
exploration of technical options and the elimination of unattainable technologies in the 
early stages of a program. This process is accomplished through an Integrated 
Product/Process Development (IPPD) approach.  ATDs ensure a higher probability of 
success when technology is transitioned to a formal acquisition program. The ATD 





 Figure 2-4, ATD Process  
From DA Pam 70-3, Research, Development, and Acquisition -- Army Acquisition Procedures 
 2. Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration  
An Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) evaluates 
the military value of advanced technologies through a large-scale experiment 
with an operational unit while ATDs evaluate technical performance in 
conjunction with a TRADOC Battle Lab or Center  [DA Pam 70-3].   
 
ACTDs are DoD sponsored programs to assess the utility of near-term, 
technology solutions that are ready to be fielded to operational organizations.  These 
solutions must address a military need validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC).  ACTDs develop the concept of operations that is needed for effective 
use of these solutions.  ACTDs provide residual equipment that is issued to an 
operational unit for a two-year extended user evaluation (EUE) period after a field 
demonstration.  At the end of the evaluation period, a decision is made whether or not to 
proceed with acquisition based on the results of the assessment and, ultimately, on 





The goal of technology transition mechanisms is to demonstrate timely and 
affordable weapon system concepts to maintain land warfare supremacy by eliminating 
or reducing risk early in an acquisition program.   
G. SUMMARY 
A common theme in infantry weapon procurement through the OICW is the 
concept of appending the soldier with a means to deliver projectiles--accurately.  Each 
succeeding program attempted to infuse current technology to produce a weapon with 
greater capability than the last.  Where the OICW program departs this paradigm is the 
integration of the system.  Instead of developing and fielding adjunct equipment to hang 
on a rifle, the OICW program intends to integrate all of the devices and technology that 
currently requires an infantryman to carry up to 22 pounds of equipment, incidental to his 
rifle.  Comparing the recent history of infantry weapons programs, the OICW would 
appear to have many of the same risks in development as its predecessors (namely 
developing a reliable weapon that meets requirements).  In many of the historical 
examples, the management of adoption of immature technology into weapon programs 





























A. RESEARCH FOCUS AND APPROACH 
The focus of the research is limited to literature published as a result of the OICW 
program, both by Government and non-Government organizations and non-structured 
interviews with people involved with system development.  Research included articles 
published by defense review firms, independent small arms policy analysis organizations 
and service component program management, combat developer and user representative 
elements.   
This is a case analysis of the management functions in transfer of an acquisition 
category-two (ACAT II)4 weapon system from the technology base to a formal 
acquisition program.  The analysis focuses on the mechanisms to help determine when 
technology is sufficiently mature to be included in an acquisition program.   
The information required to analyze exists in periodicals, Government 
publications and the comments of the acquisition team involved in the development of 
the OICW.  I chose an unstructured conversational questionnaire approach to individuals 
involved in the acquisition of the system.  Additionally, I conducted a periodical search to 
garner additional information that would allow analysis to determine if the ATD process 
poised the OICW program for success as an acquisition program.   
The research and analysis is limited to address four of the system’s Operational 
Requirements Document’s Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) to limit the study to a 
manageable scope.  An analysis of the KPPs of weight, lethality, firing position and 
system lethality provides sufficient information to draw conclusions that may be applied 
to other objective weapons programs. 





4 A categorization of a program under $140 million in research, test, development and evaluation or under 
$645 million in procurement costs 
B. CHALLENGES AND ISSUES IN THE TRANSITION FROM ATD TO 
ACQUISITION PROGRAM 
The goal of an ATD is to mature technology for inclusion in weapon systems and 
eliminate unattainable technologies in the early stages of development.  In order to 
provide for the success of the OICW ATD transition, exit criteria were developed to 
evaluate the maturity of technologies used in the development of the prototype weapons.  
The ATD provided a prototype weapon that met requirements in several areas.  The 
prototype weapon demonstrated the ability of the TA/FCS to program the 20mm 
ammunition to detonate at a specified range.  The weapon additionally demonstrated the 
direct view portion of the TA/FCS system coupled with a laser rangefinder and target aim 
points.  And importantly, the weapon system demonstrated the validity of the concept to 
engage enemy targets at standoff ranges in defilade positions.  However, four key 
performance characteristics fell short of meeting criteria supporting program transition. 
The OICW critical aspects of weight, lethality, target acquisition and firing positions did 
not meet ATD exit criteria goals.  The following data provide indicators to the maturity 
level of the technology incorporated in the OICW ATD.  The importance of this data is to 
provide a basis to assess the relative technology maturity and analyze the possible linkage 
between technology maturity and risk of program failure.  How does one know when a 
technology is ready for inclusion into a weapon or product?   
 1. Technology Readiness Levels 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Air Force 
Research Laboratory (AFRL) use technology readiness levels (TRLs) to determine the 
maturity of technologies to be incorporated into systems.  Readiness levels are measured 
on a scale of one to nine, beginning with paper studies of the basic concept, proceeding 
with laboratory demonstrations, and culminating with a technology that has proven itself 








TRL Technological Characteristics 
9 Actual system “flight proven” through successful mission operations 
8 Actual system completed and “flight qualified” through test and demonstration 
7 System prototype demonstration in an operational environment 
6 System/subsystem modes or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment 
5 Component and/or breadboard validation in a relevant environment 
4 Component and/or breadboard validation in a laboratory environment 
3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of concept 
2 Formulation of technology or application 
1 Basic principles observed and reported 
Table 3-1, Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) 
After GAO NSIAD 99-162 
The data presented will lead to a subjective, relative TRL rating based on the 
demonstrated ability of the technology to meet requirements.  Distilling the effectiveness 
of OICW system components based on ability to meet exit criteria and user requirements 
into a guide number, or TRL, will provide insight into the effectiveness of the ATD in 
preparing the weapon system and program office for a successful transition from the 
technology base. 
 2. Problem One--Weight  
The infantryman is charged with the mission to close with and defeat or destroy 
enemy forces through dismounted maneuver (fires and movement) in order to control 
terrain or other specific objectives.  This requires the infantryman to carry the means to 
exact violence on his opponents.  Quick and agile maneuver in close terrain require the 
soldier to move unencumbered.  A lightweight, effective weapon is essential to the 
infantryman in order to accomplish his mission.  A weapon that is too unwieldy or heavy 
will hinder a soldier’s ability to quickly bring his weapon to bear on the threat and inhibit 
reflexive firing in close terrain.  The major issue in weapon weight is portability, the 





stress and fatigue.  Forces operating in dismounted battlespace require the capability for 
rapid, agile maneuver in close terrain, vehicular restrictive terrain, and during airborne, 
air assault, and waterborne operations [TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66].   
The theoretical advantage of the OICW is the integration of many performance-
enhancing subsystems into one platform for the soldier.  Whether the components are 
integrated into a single system or provided piecemeal and carried in-hand and in a 
rucksack, the soldier still must carry them on the mission to have them available.  
Currently, the M4 carbine or M16 modular weapon system, with all of its attachments 
weighs approximately 19.5 pounds.  The prototype (ATD) OICW weighed 21.08 pounds 
without direct view optics, television, laser designator, Multiple Integrated Laser 
Engagement System (MILES)5 laser and other TA/FCS components [SER 2000].   A 
carrying sling would usually transfer the load from in-hand weight to the shoulder-neck 
area, but in-hand carry is frequently needed in combat situations to engage opponents, 
negotiate rough terrain or obstacles.  It is essential for combat effectiveness and 
survivability to be able to maneuver quickly with minimal physical stress with a 
lightweight, effective weapon.   
The threshold weight requirement for the OICW is less than 14 pounds when fully 
loaded with primary [8 high explosive (HE)] and secondary [30 kinetic energy (KE)] 
cartridges, full solution day/night target acquisition/fire control system (TA/FCS), power 
supply and sling.  However, the objective weight, the weight the combat developer would 
prefer the system weigh, is less than 10 pounds [ORD 2000].  It is intuitive that overall 
weapon weight reduction will improve soldier performance. 
For the ATD, the system failed to achieve its 19.9 pound loaded weight 
requirement by half of a pound.  However, since the ORD was approved after the ATD 
exit criteria were established, a better approximation of the ATD achieved weight with 
the correct ammunition load and other weapon sight components would be approximately 
21.08 pounds.   
 





5 MILES is a training engagement system that uses a sound activated laser attached to a weapon to simulate 
the effects of firing.   
 The technology demonstrators that underwent troop trials at Aberdeen 
Proving Grounds, MD weighed over 8kg (17.6 pounds). The goal was to have 
the fielded version of the OICW weigh just over 6kg (13.2 pounds), but either 
figure is substantially heavier than the M16A2. Again, however, this must be 
balanced against the weight of an M16A2 with M203 and night vision optics, 
which is approximately the same [Cutshaw 2000].   
 
Integration of the thermal sight, direct view optics, television camera, 
laser rangefinder, sight reticule, fire control system, sensors, compass, combat 
identification system, laser illuminator/pointer, force on force laser and 
embedded training into a lightweight, rugged sight is an extraordinary technical 
challenge [SER 2000].   
 
During the ATD, the OICW possessed only the laser rangefinder, direct view 
optics, fire control and reticule.  Even with the limited functionality, the prototypes 
suffered from reliability and performance problems [SER 2000].  Incorporation of 
required functions are anticipated to add to the weight issue.   
The prototype OICW used in the ATD included weight reduction measures such 
as fire control housing made of beryllium, a 20mm grenade launcher barrel made with a 
titanium sleeve, a 5.56mm barrel that is two inches shorter than that of the current M4 
carbine barrel, and lightweight components used in the weapon body.  These materiel 
alternatives to achieve weight goals increased costs through complexities in fabrication 
and increased cost over conventional materials.  The use of such materials can increase 
program cost and performance risk  
 3. Problem Two--Firing Positions 
The OICW is required to be effective from the standing, crouching, kneeling, 
sitting, prone and foxhole (standing supported) positions.  The ATD testing did not 
address the firing position parameter.  Since the ATD was a test of prototypes, a finding 
would likely be moot since the ATD weapon may not be physically representative of the 
production weapon.  Proper use of differing firing positions based on terrain and the 
threat enables the firer to see the target and maximize the probability of hit [P(h)].   
Proper firing positions provide stability and minimize aiming error.   Not all fires can be 





or obstacles may block the line of sight from these positions, especially in an assault 
where fields of fire cannot be prepared. The OICW prototypes that were tested by Army 
Research Lab (ARL) at Aberdeen Test Center (ATC) had limited capabilities [SER 
2000].  Additionally, the weapons were fired from only the kneeling supported position.  
This limited the ability to assess whether there is any degradation in performance when 
fired from prone, sitting or standing positions required by the ORD.  However, the 
soldiers participating in the test events provided some information from the human 
factors questionnaires. 
A human factors engineering (HFE) questionnaire administered to the 12 soldiers 
involved in the OICW testing.  One of the HFE issues that merit increased analysis was 
the potential for problems with the 20mm ammunition magazine when firing from the 
prone, sitting and standing positions.  The 20mm weapon is a bullpup6 configuration.  
This means that the construction of the weapon has the firing hand forward of the action 
and ammunition supply.  When posed with the question whether the location of the 
20mm magazine posed any problems in firing under field conditions, 10 of the 12 
respondents answered yes.  Particular answers included concerns over striking the 20mm 
magazine when executing individual movement techniques (low/high crawl, conduct of 
short rushes).   Six of 12 respondents commented that weight, size and awkwardness of 
the prototype weapons were the worst features of the OICW.  Since the weapons tested 
were prototypes with likely physical configuration changes in the future, further testing 
and analysis are required to fully answer the requirement.  Despite the prototype 
designation of the ATD OICW, the results of the HFE questionnaire administered to the 
test participants demonstrate that factors of magazine location coupled with weight and 
awkwardness infer firing from positions other than kneeling supported may be 
compromised.  Aggravating factors in maintaining a steady hold in realistic conditions 
can increase errors in engaging targets. 





6 A rifle in a bullpup configuration places the grip and firing hand forward of the chamber and ammunition 
supply.  This configuration allows for the weapon to maintain the same barrel length as a conventional rifle, 
but with a shorter overall length. 
 4. Problem Three--Range/Lethality  
Errors inherent in weapons that propel projectiles are categorized by interior, 
exterior and terminal ballistic variability.  Factors that must be considered in determining 
effectiveness include: range-to-target error, aiming error, round-to-round dispersion error, 
munitions detonation error and lethal radius or terminal effects error.  These errors must 
remain individually miniscule in order for the series of ballistic events to be effective, 
that is to be consistently accurate. 
  Determining the effectiveness of a weapon system is difficult.  There is no 
current methodology to directly measure the probability of incapacitation of enemy 
personnel based on testing.  During the ATD, Point exposed target P(i) was measured 
using two Army Material System Analysis Activity (AMSAA) models.  The tests 
included the soldier’s ability to accurately determine the range to a target with a laser 
rangefinder, the soldier’s ability to accurately aim the weapon, measurement of the 
munitions’ ballistic performance, and the measurements of the bursting munitions at the 
point of detonation.   
Although the bursting radius of 20mm munitions for the OICW are classified, the 
accuracy in delivering an explosive round to the target may be used as a surrogate to help 
determine the effectiveness of the system.  The OICW 20mm ammunition is required to 
provide a threshold probability of incapacitation [P(i)] of 0.50 day or night from the 
minimum arming distance to 500 meters.  The purpose behind this requirement is to 
allow the soldier to engage enemy personnel from a standoff position, beyond effective 
range of most assault rifles.   
The technological goal for the high explosive air burst (HEAB) system 
is a P(i)/s = 0.50 against the described target.  Sensitivity analysis shows 
tremendous gains in force effectiveness up to a P(i)/s = 0.50 and little 
significance beyond.  A P(i)/s = 0.50 allows a single soldier equipped with 
OICW to defeat a 9 man threat squad with a minimum of ammunition - 18 
rounds (9 / 0.50) [ORD 2000]. 
 
A P(i) of 0.50 and a combat load of 40-20mm rounds would allow the OICW 
equipped soldier the capability to defeat 9 exposed, protected targets  and engage in a 





load and reduces resupply requirements.  The objective requirement is for the system to 
provide a P(i) of 0.90 from minimum arming distance to 750 meters.   
 
 
The grenade itself is a product of modern miniaturization technology 
and incorporates not only programming from the fire-control system, but a 
revolution counter to determine range for an airburst. Lethal radius of the 
grenade is claimed to be approximately 3m [Cutshaw 2000]. 
 
The lethal radius (where the P(i) is .50) did not meet requirements for point, 
exposed targets.  A significant factor in P(i) is accuracy and the process of determining 
the correct range to the target.   Error in relation to the bursting radius of 20mm 
munitions to the target is the result of several factors:  Range estimation errors [including 
environmental effects such as obscurants (dust, fog and snow) wind and mirage effects 
due to thermal differentiation,] soldier aim error, round to round dispersion, round 
detonation variability and variability in lethal effect of each round.  Range estimation 
errors resulting from the ATD for a stationary, exposed target was 6.6 meters.   
In order to attain larger burst areas per round, micro-electro-mechanical systems 
(MEMS) may be required to enable larger amounts of energetic material to take the place 
of current safe, arm and fusing mechanisms.  MEMS are the integration of mechanical 
elements, sensors, actuators, and electronics on a silicon wafer through the micro 
fabrication technology.  
Microelectronics are fabricated using integrated circuit (IC) processes and micro -
mechanical components are fabricated using machining processes that selectively etch 
away parts of a silicon wafer or add new structural layers to form the mechanical and 
electromechanical devices.  To meet requirements for lethality, technology is in a rather 
immature state for micro mechanical safe and arming mechanisms and MEMS used in 
airburst small arms munitions [JSSAP 2001].   
Given the relatively short bursting radius of the 20mm ammunition compared to 
the ranges required for effectiveness, it is imperative that the weapon system, to include 





precisely where intended.  Accuracy, precision of detonation and lethal effects are the 
cornerstones of this weapon program, and another topic of concern.   
The lethal radius of HEAB munitions should be improved and 
demonstrated in Government tests [SER 2000]. 
For defilade targets, the OICW primary HEAB ammunition is required to provide 
a per shot P(i) of 0.35 against an individual threat soldier protected with body armor and 
in a defilade position to 500 meters.   
To accomplish missions and survive in conflicts beyond 2007, the focus 
of the OICW must be on lethality against defilade targets at extended ranges.  A 
P(i) of 0.35 is infinitely better than baseline systems because current systems 
have no chance of engaging defilade targets (e.g., targets gone to ground, in 
foxholes, in trenches, behind trees and walls, or on rooftops) [ORD 2000].  
 
In addition to the factors related to OICW error for stationary exposed point 
targets, additional sources of error affected the conduct of the defilade target tests.  
Increased error resulted in the inclusion of a moving target, the increased difficulty in 
accurately ranging to and engaging a target at the exact time and location where the target 
goes into a defilade.   
The process of range estimation provides the largest source of error in target 
engagement.  For defilade targets during the ATD test firings, gunners produced a range 
estimating error standard deviation of 15.3 meters alone at a range of 300 meters to the 
target.  Given the accumulation of additional error such as soldier aim error, round to 
round dispersion, round detonation variability and variability in lethal effect of each 
round, there is an apparent large variability in target effects for the ammunition. 
Error in relation to the bursting radius of 20mm munitions to the target is a 
significant factor in P(i).  Determining range of defilade targets is more difficult than for 
stationary exposed targets due to tracking target movement and estimating the location of 
the target while in defilade.  The defilade target range error was more than twice the 
stationary exposed target range error.  Demonstrated range estimation error shows an 
integration issue between the user and the component.  Given these factors, a burst radius 
of approximately three meters, and the corresponding relative large amount of variability 
in burst location, it is likely the combat and material developers will have to address both 





engagement to attain the threshold requirement.  Here, technology has not been matured 
to overcome difficulty in accurately determining range to target when that target is 
moving, or allow for a virtual point of reference to assist the soldier in determining where 
the target last appeared.  According to the ATEC System Evaluation Report, a possibility 
for improving range estimation error is the inclusion of a laser beam stabilizing and cuing 
module added to the TA/FCS.  This module would detect movement and place an aiming 
aid around the target.  This coupled with a beam steering device would keep the laser 
centered on the target providing continuous range updates to the TA/FCS.   
 5. Problem Four--Target Acquisition 
The OICW target acquisition/fire control system (TA/FCS) is intended to provide 
the infantryman with the means to perform all three aspects of target acquisition through 
a single, integrated subsystem and at greater ranges than current methods.  Target 
acquisition includes detection, recognition and identification of a potential target.  
Detection is the discovery of an object that has military significance.  Recognition is the 
ability to determine if the detected target poses a threat.  Identification is the 
determination of the specific configuration (e.g., unprotected troops in the open) of the 
target.  Identification assists the gunner in determining the effective employment of 
weapons.   
The target acquisition/fire control system is required to be a single, compact, 
integrated day/night eye-safe device capable of operations in all environments.  The 
OICW TA/FCS is designed to allow a soldier-operated full solution fire control system 
that ensures the firer can maximize system effectiveness from zero to 1,100 meters.  The 
goal is to allow the individual soldier to detect and engage stationary, moving and 
defilade (point and area) targets on the battlefield during day, night and limited visibility 
conditions. 
The fire control is required to include range finding data, allow for manual 
indexation of range based on laser rangefinder data, ballistic solution with inputs for cant, 
air pressure and temperature, reticules to assist the firer in holding to an adjusted aim 





identification capability, training laser engagement system, infrared laser aiming and 
illuminator/pointer, thermal sighting capability, daylight television and direct view optics.   
The challenge for the developers is to maintain weight requirements while meeting the 
many fire control functionality requirements.   
There was no thermal sight available for testing in the ATD phase.  However, 
with similar weapon sights for the modular weapons system (MWS) show promise for 
incorporating a thermal sight into the FCS  [SER 2000].  In clear air at 1100 meters, a 
medium thermal weapon sight (MWTS) demonstrated requisite capability for meeting 
OICW ORD requirements.   
D. LESSONS LEARNED  
The Air Force Research Laboratory, a leader in the adoption of characterizing 
technology for inclusion in programs, considers TRL 6 an acceptable risk for a weapon 
system entering the program definition stage, the point at which DOD launches its 
weapon programs, and TRL 7 an acceptable risk for the engineering and manufacturing 
development stage. This is an important distinction because leading commercial firms 
launch a new product later than DOD, after technology development is complete. They 
refer to this point as the beginning of product development, the point at which they 
commit to developing and manufacturing the product. Typically, the GAO report 
contends, technology is still being developed when DoD weapon system programs are 
launched--the time at which a weapon system is far enough along to compare to a 
commercial product development is likely to be at or after the start of engineering and 
manufacturing development. 
To contrast, the GAO reviewed commercial and DOD experiences in 
incorporating different technologies into new product and weapon system designs.  The 
technologies were drawn from commercial firms recognized for their success in 
developing technically advanced products more quickly than the products' predecessors 
and several DOD weapon system programs that incorporated advanced technologies, 
including some that did not encounter problems and some that did. A difference in the 





technologies at the point they were included in product development.  Hughes Space and 
Communications demonstrated a successful case with the development and launch of the 
HS-702 satellite in 1999.  Hughes’ approach was not to accelerate technology 
development but to shorten product development by maturing the technology first.   
Hughes began developing solar cell technology that had the potential of greatly 
increasing the electrical power on satellites. By 1985, a Hughes laboratory had 
demonstrated the technology by ground testing prototypes.  Hughes was not satisfied that 
the supporting technology (materials, reactors, and test equipment) was mature enough to 
sustain development and production of the new technology on a satellite.  This 
infrastructure was considered critical to meeting the cost and schedule requirements of a 
product. As a result, Hughes did not transition the technology to a product, but kept it in 
a research environment, separate from cost and schedule pressures.  In the early 1990s, 
Hughes launched a new satellite program-- the HS-702-- that would use the solar cell 
technology to beat the competition. After a laboratory demonstration in 1993, Hughes 
successfully used the new technology on an existing version of a satellite before it began 
product development on the HS-702 satellite. By 1994, it had determined that the 
business base was available to sustain development and production of the new satellite.  
Hughes waited 10 years for the demonstrated technology to meet the requirements. The 
new technology took 10 years to mature enough for product readiness [SpaceRef 2001, 
GAO 1999].  
E. SUMMARY 
The prototype demonstration of the key performance parameters of the OICW 
during the ATD shows at least three of the KPPs were not met.  These data assist in 
demonstrating the relative technology maturity and the possible linkage between 
inadequate technology maturity and increased program risk.   
The goal of the ATD was to mature technology for inclusion in the weapon 
system and eliminate unattainable technologies in the early stages of development.  In the 
actual conduct of the ATD, the system failed to achieve its 19.9 pound loaded weight 
requirement by half of a pound.  Since the weapons tested were prototypes and with 





human factors questionnaire demonstrated possible issues involving magazine location 
coupled with weight and awkwardness.  The third parameter of range and lethality 
demonstrated the lethal radius (where the P(i) is .50) did not meet requirements for point, 
exposed targets.  Additionally, during the ATD test firings, gunners produced a range 
estimating error standard deviation of 15.3 meters at a range of 300 meters to defilade 
targets.  Although there was no thermal sight available for testing in the ATD phase, tests 
of similar weapon sights for the modular weapons system (MWS) have shown promise 
for incorporating a thermal sight into the OICW. 
The major risk areas identified from the ATD are: 1) maintaining 
performance in each of its three modes in a fully integrated sight, 2) achieving 
performance within weight requirements for an integrated sight, and 3) the 
ruggedness of an integrated unit [SER 2000].   
 
Despite these apparent shortcomings, the milestone decision authority (MDA) 
allowed the program to transition to an acquisition program.  However, as a risk 
mitigation effort, the program was directed to transition into a program and risk reduction 
(PDRR) phase rather than the planned engineering and manufacturing development 
(EMD).  The key performance parameters of weight, firing positions, point exposed 
stationary and defilade target probability of incapacitation and system ruggedness were 
either not met or not evaluated.  
Incorporation of advanced technologies before they are mature has been a major source 
of cost increases, schedule delays, and performance problems on weapon systems [GAO 
1999].  In the succeeding chapter, I will analyze the effectiveness of the ATD in 































A. ANALYSIS/LESSONS LEARNED 
Leading commercial firms have changed their practices for developing 
products and have achieved the kinds of results DOD seeks.  Maturing new 
technology before it is included in products is one of the main determinants of 
these firms' successes. This practice holds promise for DOD, for immature 
technologies have been a main source of problems on weapon systems [GAO 
1999].  
The goal of the ATD was to mature technology for inclusion in weapon systems 
and eliminate unattainable technologies in the early stages of development.  The ATD 
key performance parameters of weight, firing positions, and point exposed stationary and 
defilade target probability of incapacitation were either not met or not evaluated.  
However, the milestone decision authority (MDA) allowed the program to transition to 
an acquisition program.  Why would a program be given the green light to proceed when 
so many of the key parameters of the system did not meet the criteria for transition?  The 
probable answer is linked with the way technology development mechanisms are funded 
in the DoD.   
The DoD is likely to move technologies to product development 
programs before they are mature. Science and technology efforts, which 
traditionally operate within fixed budget levels, do not necessarily have the 
funds to mature technology to the higher TRLs.  Programs are more able to 
command the large budgets necessary for reaching these levels. The pressures 
exerted on new programs to offer unique performance at low cost encourage 
acceptance of unproven technologies [GAO 1999]. 
 
The transition of the OICW to an acquisition program was not an act of wholesale 
disregard for best practices in technology development.  With the test and evaluation 
community wanting to see greater adherence to exit criteria, the transition was likely an 
acknowledgement that the money and resources required to further develop the required 
technology lay within the Program Office and not the science and technology 
development mechanisms.  An acquisition advisory board recommended the OICW 
proceed to PDRR with concurrence of the Army Staff.  With the results of the ATD 
failing to meet the exit criteria, this approval to proceed demonstrates the inconsistency in 





increased program management funding and manpower that can be brought to bear on 
developing a weapon comes the increased risk of maturing key technologies concurrent 
with managing an acquisition program.  Each of the four KPPs that were not tested or did 
not pass ATD exit criteria increased technological risk to the Program Office.  These 
increased risks allow the possibility of lengthened development times, increased costs 
and potential program termination in the current acquisition culture.   
 1. Problem One—Weight 
The threshold weight requirement for the OICW is less than 14 pounds with all 
stated capabilities and when fully loaded with prescribed ammunition.  However, the 
objective weight, the weight the combat developer would prefer the system weigh, is less 
than 10 pounds [ORD 2000].  For the ATD, the system failed to achieve its 19.9 pound 
loaded weight requirement by half of a pound, representing an approximately 2.5% 
shortfall, but without all of the requisite capabilities.   The estimated 21.08-pound weight 
is a better representation of the objective system, given the state-of-the-art of the systems 
that were omitted from the ATD system.  This increases the overweight percentage to just 
under 6% of the ATD goal, is over 50% greater than the ORD threshold weight of 14 
pounds and more than 100% greater than the objective weight. 
With such a disparity between the threshold and prototype weight, there will have 
to be significant materiel and engineering changes to the weapon, or relaxation of the 
requirement.  If the requirement is inflexible, we can assess the TRL for weight as being 













TRL Technological Characteristics 
9 Actual system “flight proven” through successful mission operations 
8 Actual system completed and “flight qualified” through test and demonstration 
7 System prototype demonstration in an operational environment 
6 System/subsystem modes or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment 
5 Component and/or breadboard validation in a relevant environment 
4 Component and/or breadboard validation in a laboratory environment 
3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of concept 
2 Formulation of technology or application 
1 Basic principles observed and reported 
Table 4-1, Weight TRL 
As noted in chapter III, the Air Force Research Laboratory considers TRL 6 an 
acceptable risk for a weapon system entering the program definition stage, and TRL 7 an 
acceptable risk for the engineering and manufacturing development stage.  Ideally, 
technology should be at a maturity level of TRL 6 before proceeding to PDRR.   
Not meeting the exit criteria for weight will create a significant technological 
challenge for the Program Office.  Because the prototypes in the ATD were manufactured 
with exotic materials (beryllium fire control housing, titanium sleeves for the barrels and 
composite materials in the receiver) in an attempt to achieve the ATD weight goal, the 
Program Office and contractor have few, if any, alternatives to further reduce system 
weight with the current technology available.  This will require the Program Office to 
commit more funding to the development of alternative materials or achieve relief from 
the requirements of the combat developer and user.   
Since the user is the infantryman and the amount of equipment a soldier can be 
expected to carry while remaining combat-effective is limited, the Program Office will 
likely have to expend significant resources and much effort to influence the Combat 
Developer to make some difficult trade-offs for any compromise from the threshold 
weight requirement.  Additionally, with continued developmental testing  addressing the 





technical performance measures.  In today’s acquisition culture, even developmental 
testing conducted by the Program Office advertises progress, or lack thereof, in attaining  
key performance parameters (KPPs) to the acquisition and political communities.  These 
test results typically create negative perceptions that have consequences impacting 
funding availability and may jeopardize the entire program.  By accepting a relatively 
low TRL for weight using technologically advanced and costly materials, the Program 
Office is placed in a difficult situation of having to develop cutting edge technology to 
the point where it can be integrated into a weapon system economically. 
 2. Problem Two--Firing Positions 
Advanced technology demonstration testing did not address the firing position 
parameter.  Since the ATD was a test of prototypes, a finding would likely be moot since 
the ATD weapon may not be physically representative of the production weapon, 
although ATD data on differing firing positions would have provided valuable 
information regarding the design demonstrated.  More importantly, data on firing position 
effectiveness would have provided significant insight regarding the weapon design 
maturity and would have allowed a distinction between a breadboard platform, TRL 5, 
and a brassboard platform, TRL 6.   
Despite the prototype designation of the ATD OICW, the results of the human 
factors questionnaire administered to the test participants demonstrate that factors of 
magazine location, coupled with weight and awkwardness of the weapon frame, infer 
firing from positions other than kneeling supported may be compromised.  Aggravating 
factors in maintaining a steady hold in realistic conditions can increase errors in engaging 
targets, reducing weapon system suitability and negatively impacting soldier combat 
effectiveness.  Although the ATD did tacitly address the issue of differing firing 
positions, it is important to note what the ATD did not measure—what the OICW 
configuration should conform to in terms of soldier firing position.   
The weapon must provide the soldier with firepower in a wide range of mission 
and terrain combinations.  The use of varying firing positions is critically important when 
conducting dismounted maneuver.  A soldier can be expected to fight from any terrain 





four major positions: standing kneeling, sitting and prone—with standing and kneeling 
most likely to be used while in enemy contact.   
The weight of the prototype weapon will adversely affect the ability of the soldier 
to maintain a steady hold in order to range to, and fire on the target.  With an awkward 
hold and weight exceeding 19 pounds, a soldier firing in an urbanized environment where 
speed of action and limited use of supporting materials require an offhand hold (no 
additional support of the weapon weight) will have difficulty in maintaining consistent, 
steady holds.  Whether in the standing or kneeling position, the soldier must support the 
weapon using his own skeletal and muscle structure.  The time to reduce weapon wobble 
must be long enough to orient the weapon, aim, range then fire.  It is unlikely that any 
soldier would be able to maintain such a hold for more than a few seconds.  Certainly, 
expert marksmen do have the capability to hold a heavy, match grade rifle to reduce 
weapon wobble and attain accurate fires.  The difference is that the target shooter can 
assume a stance where the weapon can be place very near the shooter’s center of gravity.  
For the prototype OICW, the firer must extend both arms out further from the body’s 
center of gravity.  This act requires more use of muscle to maintain a steady hold rather 
than relying upon skeletal structure.  The result is a reduced ability to control muzzle 
wobble and reduced time to maintain that steady hold.  While in contact, however, the 
soldier must contend with more than simply holding the weapon steady.  A soldier must 
also move in addition to shooting, communicating and sustaining for success in combat. 
The soldier’s weapon must be designed to permit quick movement and allow 
quick shouldering or bringing the weapon to bear on the enemy to provide precision point 
fires or suppression of an area.  When the soldier must execute individual movement 
techniques to evade acquisition or effect bounding maneuver, an awkward weapon may 
adversely affect his ability to conduct such movements, quickly with ease of action.  In 
this instance, a soldier operating as part of a larger element-- fire team or squad-- may 
have to roll from a prone position to move to the flank of his location to execute a quick 
rush to the next firing position.  This act is to avoid the possibility of being engaged by an 
enemy who has acquired the soldier’s position and is prepared to fire on that position 
once the soldier has exposed himself to move forward.  The soldier will roll to the flank 





buy enough time to stand, rush and assume another prone firing position before the 
enemy can re-acquire and engage.  
Of particular concern among these conditions would be an assault on terrain with 
little in the way of relief or undulations in the terrain to provide natural cover (physical 
protection from projectiles) and concealment (camouflage).  Given a scenario of an 
assault against a prepared fighting position in desert terrain, the height of the prototype 
OICW (the distance from the inserted magazine bottom to the top of the TA/FCS) would 
place the firer’s head dangerously high while firing from a prone position in an open area, 
prone firing position.  What the combat developer requires, and the issue the Program 
Office must contend with, is how the components of the system may be reduced in height 
to allow a soldier to hold, aim, fire and adjust rapid subsequent shots while maintaining a 
very low silhouette in open terrain.  Attaining such a goal will likely require a significant 
engineering redesign in the form of reducing the TA/FCS height, minimizing the distance 
in the axis between the bores of the two component weapons, minimizing the size of 
recoil dampening mechanisms and decreasing the height or the relative positions of the 
magazines.  A major engineering redesign of the OICW means that the ATD design was 
not representative of that needed to meet the program objectives.  By definition, the ATD 
system was a breadboard representation of the objective system. 
Characterizing the physical configuration of the OICW in terms of a TRL 
demonstrates a maturity of 6.  This is misleading by the fact, however, that only a single 
firing position was used in the testing.   Given the indications from the Human Factors 














TRL Technological Characteristics 
9 Actual system “flight proven” through successful mission operations 
8 Actual system completed and “flight qualified” through test and demonstration 
7 System prototype demonstration in an operational environment 
6 System/subsystem modes or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment 
5 Component and/or breadboard validation in a relevant environment 
4 Component and/or breadboard validation in a laboratory environment 
3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of concept 
2 Formulation of technology or application 
1 Basic principles observed and reported 
Table 4-2, Firing position (physical configuration) TRL 
With the ATD not fully addressing the concern of firing positions, testing in a 
relevant environment in itself will not validate the design aspects of the weapon based on 
the available technology.  This fit between demonstration of technology to support a 
compact, quick-handling weapon and the desire to transition to EMD characterizes the 
ATD as not sufficient to successfully transition the weapon to an acquisition program.   
This will prove to be a very challenging aspect of the weapon system for the 
Program Office.  As with the weight issue, there is likely to be little relief in the 
requirements for firing positions.  The Program Office will have the task of carefully 
optimizing strength of materials to weight and requiring significant engineering changes 
to current design, or possibly a total redesign, to attain threshold requirements. 
 3. Problem Three--Range/Lethality 
The OICW ATD did not meet the criteria for lethality for point exposed and 
defilade targets.  This issue has three main components for the Program Office to 
address: Munitions technology development, accuracy improvement and tradeoff 





The burst radius of the 20mm round did not meet criteria for the ATD.  The 
rounds used during the ATD used fusing technology using micro-mechanical devices to 
determine arming and detonation distances.  In order to increase the effectiveness of the 
ammunition, changes in explosive and fusing will have to be considered.  This will 
increase the time required to develop the weapon system to meet requirements in the 
ORD.  With the ammunition developed and the developmental nature of the 
demonstration, the lethality component of the OICW is characterized by a maturity of 
TRL of 3.   
TRL Technological Characteristics 
9 Actual system “flight proven” through successful mission operations 
8 Actual system completed and “flight qualified” through test and demonstration 
7 System prototype demonstration in an operational environment 
6 System/subsystem modes or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment 
5 Component and/or breadboard validation in a relevant environment 
4 Component and/or breadboard validation in a laboratory environment 
3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of concept 
2 Formulation of technology or application 
1 Basic principles observed and reported 
Table 4-3, 20mm ammunition (lethality) TRL 
During the ATD, soldiers firing the OICW at defilade targets demonstrated a 
sizeable margin of error in aiming the weapon, significantly reducing the P(h) and the 
corresponding combat effectiveness of the 20mm portion of the weapon system.  The 
margin of error was attributed to the difficulty in estimating a range to a target that was in 
a defilade position behind cover.  The inability to directly aim the laser at the target 
meant that the firer lacks a reference point to gain ranging information from the laser.  In 
these situations, the firer must make a best guess as to where to place the laser aiming 
light for more accurate determination of range.  However, this assumes the target is in a 
position with few or no reference points in which to laser-range a target location.  If the 
environment were changed to an urban area, and the target within a room with a window, 





Program Office will be to develop courses of action to address the accuracy issue.  
Courses of action can range from added functionality to assist the firer in maintaining a 
steady hold on the target (bipod or laser steering) to weight reduction and enhancing the 
weapon’s balance/configuration to assist in a more stable hold.  With the prototypes 
weighing almost 20 pounds and firers having to assume a difficult weapon hold, the 
firer’s ability to reduce weapon “muzzle wobble” is diminished.   
Lethality is primary to the effectiveness of the weapon, but also may allow 
requirements tradeoff from the combat developer.  The results of the ATD for the 
accuracy issue may require the Program Office to manage the development of technology 
to increase the effectiveness of the 20mm munitions.  This could have a significant effect 
on the cost and schedule of the program if new technologies are required to replace 
existing ammunition fusing and explosive mechanisms.  An alternative is to influence the 
combat developer to trade-off the requirement for lethality, range, or a combination of 
both.  In either case, the Program Office will have to expend additional resources to 
manage the technology development to allow a greater bursting radius of the 20mm 
ammunition or to provide supporting data to support a relaxation of the requirement.   
The ATD provided no indication regarding the ability to mature the 20mm technology 
sufficiently to meet the ORD requirements.  Failure to meet the requirement or to provide 
convincing data to support relaxation of the existing requirement, adds significant 
technological risk to the program and, in the worst case, could result in the system being 
deemed ineffective which typically results in termination of the program. 
 4. Problem Four--Target Acquisition 
During the ATD, the OICW possessed only the laser rangefinder, direct view 
optics, fire control and reticule.  The ATD prototypes did not satisfy all of the user’s 
requirements  [SER 2000].  There was no thermal sight available for testing in the ATD 
phase; however, a previously tested medium thermal weapon sight (MWTS) 
demonstrated requisite capability for meeting OICW ORD requirements.  There was no 
exit criterion for a thermal sight and for much of the ORD required functionality of the 
TA/FCS.  With a prototype TA/FCS having only the laser rangefinder, direct view optics, 





burden of managing the inclusion of thermal imaging, a training laser, inclinometer, 
daylight television, combat identification system, compass and laser illuminator/pointer 
into the sight.  Addition of the required functions to the TA/FCS is likely to increase 
weight.  The impact on the Program Office is increased performance risk in managing the 
reduction of system weight, and the added required functionality of the TA/FCS. With 
the TA/FCS having only three of the required ten functions, it can be characterized as 
breadboard.  The three functions demonstrated are characterized by a maturity of TRL 5, 
but the remaining functions fall in TRL 3, as they were not incorporated into the 
functioning ATD system.  
 
TRL Technological Characteristics 
9 Actual system “flight proven” through successful mission operations 
8 Actual system completed and “flight qualified” through test and demonstration 
7 System prototype demonstration in an operational environment 
6 System/subsystem modes or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment 
5 Component and/or breadboard validation in a relevant environment 
4 Component and/or breadboard validation in a laboratory environment 
3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of concept 
2 Formulation of technology or application 
1 Basic principles observed and reported 
Table 4-4, Target acquisition TRL 
B. SUMMARY 
None of the technologies supporting key performance parameters included in the 
OICW ATD were developed to a maturity level sufficient to reduce risk to an acceptable 
level for the Program Manager.  OICW prototype system weight for the ATD was 19 
pounds—with the use of lightweight metals and composites.  The prototype weight 
represents the current state-of-the-art in lightweight materials, forcing the Program to 
achieve the weight requirement in time for a 2009 fielding—the result is increased 





economically produce weapon components from those materials.  The heavy weight of 
the OICW relative to similar weapons, and a configuration that does not afford a steady 
hold, negatively affect the soldier’s ability to aim and range to a target.  In addition, 
heavier weapons have a negative impact on soldier endurance affecting combat mission 
performance.  The technology to support miniaturization of components and a 
configuration to support survivability was not mature for the ATD—the result is 
increased performance risk for the Program.  The lethality of the OICW primary 
ammunition did not meet exit criteria.  The effort to increase the effectiveness of the 
20mm round is likely to involve application of new technology to increase the payload of 
explosive to increase effectiveness. The result is likely performance and schedule risk in 
managing the development and integration of new technologies.   
The likely outcome of the OICW program will be an ultimately successful system 
that, through iterative refinements in pre- and post-production, meets possibly relaxed 
requirements.  But given the immature technologies noted in the ATD, these successes 
will be at the expense of time to field the system and increased development and life 
cycle costs.  The adoption of immature technology in the OICW program is consistent 
with historical examples of weapon system acquisition programs.   
(Service) programs allowed more technology development to continue 
into product development.  Consequently, the programs proceeded with much 
less knowledge--and thus more risk—about required technologies, design 
capability, and producibility.  The programs' discovery process persisted much 
longer, even after the start of production.  Turbulence in program outcomes--in 
the form of production problems and associated cost and schedule increases—
was the predictable consequence as the transition to production was made  
[GAO 1998]. 
According to Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, ATDs shall be used to 
demonstrate the maturity and potential of advanced technologies for enhanced military 
operational capability or cost effectiveness.  Technology must have been demonstrated in 
a relevant environment to be considered mature enough to use for product development 
in systems integration. If technology is not mature, the service component is required to 
use an alternative technology that is mature and that can meet the user’s needs  [DoDI 
5000.2 (2001)].  However, as the data demonstrates, the OICW program now must 
integrate technologies that were not matured, and in numerous cases, not demonstrated, 





For those technologies with the most promise for application to weapon 
systems, component science and technology executives must be responsible for 
maturing technology readiness level that puts the receiving MDA at low risk for 
systems integration and acceptable to the cognizant MDA, or until the MDA is 
no longer considering that technology [DoDI 5000.2 2001]. 
A possible answer to the question of why the OICW transitioned to an acquisition 
program is funding.  Members of the acquisition team (material and combat developers 
and contractors) are incentivized to transition the program to an acquisition program as 
rapidly as possible.  An established Program Office is more likely to  obtain the funding 
necessary for developing technologies more quickly than science and technology efforts.  
The risk with regard to the program manager is the fairly rigid requirement to meet cost, 
performance and schedule goals managing the development of technology that may not 
conform to the timelines established.  The pressures exerted on new programs to offer 
performance to meet requirements encourage acceptance of unproven technologies.   
Although the intent of ATDs is to help speed the introduction of 
advanced technologies needed to develop future systems and allow 
experimentation with technology-driven operational issues, acquisition 
programs are likely to move technologies to product development programs 
before they are mature [GAO 1999].   
The demonstrated readiness levels for the key technologies included in the OICW 
did not meet the intent of Defense Department and Army requirements for technology 






V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this research is to examine the efficacy of the OICW’s ATD in 
preparing the system for transition to an acquisition program.  The analysis in chapter IV 
provided insight into the effectiveness of the OICW ATD approach to developing 
technologically advanced weapon systems and transition to program management.  
The ATD process did not produce a system design incorporating a path 
leading to the fulfillment of all KPPs and other requirements, most notably the 
preparation for the operating environment (reliability, ruggedization, 
maintenance, Soldier System weight, electronic battlefield) [Acquisition 
Strategy 2001]. 
 1. Problem One—Weight  
The OICW program transitioned too early for technology to support a dual 
munitions weapon weighing under the ORD required 14 pounds.  The ascribed TRL of 5 
for weight did not support the transition of the program from the ATD.  The adoption of 
the program under these auspices will inculcate unacceptable performance and cost risks 
to the program, putting the program success in significant jeopardy.   
 2. Problem Two--Firing Positions  
Significant design immaturity existed at the time of the OICW transfer from ATD 
to PDRR.  Firing positions were not fully addressed during the ATD and the single firing 
position demonstrated using the prototype OICW was assessed at TRL 3.It is expected 
the fielded design of the weapon will differ significantly from the prototypes tested, 
requiring significant redesign.  As there were indicators that the untested firing positions 
could be problematic with the ATD engineering design, a more realistic TRL of 3 could 
be assessed for the system, as it would be in the breadboard category. The original intent 
of the program was to mature key technologies to facilitate successful transition from 
ATD to EMD, but based on HFE questionnaires, the ATD design is expected to be 
awkward to hold and fire in many of the expected firing positions required by the 





maturing the weapon design into a form and fit that better suited soldiers operating in a 
realistic environment. 
 3. Problem Three--Range/Lethality 
The effectiveness of the 20mm OICW subsystem was not successfully 
demonstrated indicating the technology for properly ranging and engaging the ORD 
specified target set was not sufficiently mature to transition out of the ATD.  During the 
ATD, soldiers firing the OICW at defilade targets demonstrated a sizeable margin of 
error in aiming the weapon.  Additionally, the OICW ATD did not meet the criteria for 
lethality for point exposed and defilade targets.  The transition of the program before the 
ammunition was developed to meet requirements will require the program to not only 
develop the weapon but also redesign the primary ammunition while developing the 
weapon itself.  The TRL of 3 creates unacceptable cost and performance risk to the 
program.   
 4. Problem Four--Target Acquisition 
 The ATD was conducted without a fully functioning prototype TA/FCS and 
those associated Key Performance Parameters were not demonstrated, leaving the 
Program Office with an unknown risk of successful development or integration of the 
critical TA/FCS functions.  The TA/FCS had the laser rangefinder, direct view optics, fire 
control and reticule portion of functionality.  The additional functions of thermal 
imaging, a training laser, inclinometer, daylight television, combat identification, 
compass and laser illuminator/pointer were neither present nor tested in a breadboard 
design.  This testing of components of the system placed the demonstrated functions of 
the TA/FCS at TRL 5, but the remaining functions would clearly fall in TRL 3 as they 
were not incorporated into the functioning ATD system.  The effect on the Program 
Office is increased performance risk in managing the reduction of system weight with the 





The ATD failed to demonstrate the technology to provide the PM and MDA with 
low risk technical solutions to attain threshold requirements.  The data and analysis 
focused on the discrete technologies that in the spirit of the ATD would permit inclusion 
of the technology with the corresponding increase in capabilities without undue risk.  
What also must be considered is the effect of the integration of technologies to provide 
the required total system functions.  The evaluation of the ATD was to characterize the 
effectiveness and suitability measures of the technology demonstrated within the 
framework of the exit criteria.  What may be warranted is a characterization of the sum of 
technologies incorporated into the prototype system to render an overall measure of 
technical integration maturity.  With TRLs for weight, firing positions, range/lethality 
and target acquisition of 5, 5, 3 and 3 respectively, the overall TRL for system integration 
would be at most 3 and there are significant risks associated with integration of functions 
that were not demonstrated or that were not successful in the ATD;  
…the integration of technologies at relatively high TRLs does not mean 
the system enjoys a high TRL.  “If several technologies are at TRL 7, let’s say, 
the system may only be at TRL 3 due to the complexities of integrating those 
technologies” [Snider 2001]. 
This characterization of the OICW ATD demonstrates the willingness to 
transition technology from the science and technology sector too early for that technology 
to allow functionality without undue risk.  The result is that the onus then falls on the 
program manager and staff to manage not only the management of the program but also 
the development of sufficiently mature technologies to allow that program to be 
successful.   
Given the results of the OICW ATD, OPM Small Arms decided that following a 
Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) philosophy would provide the OICW PD&RR 
phase of the program the best chance of reaching the ORD requirements and provide 
sufficient data for the User to make intelligent trade-off decisions.  This was the best 
course of action possible under the circumstances and the environment the PM must 
operate within to achieve success.     
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology 
ASA (ALT) should require strict adherence to the use of technology readiness levels.  
The ATD process should use TRL 7 as a rigid requirement before technologies are to be 





The ASA (ALT) should enforce the proper characterization of technologies being 
considered and resist attempts by the acquisition community to adopt technology before it 
is matured so that it inculcates only low risk to a program.  For example, 3M is 
developing a fuel cell technology for which they have built 15 prototypes for testing 
purposes at TRL 7 or higher. However, because the technology has not yet met all of the 
cost, schedule, and performance targets for product development, they have not allowed 
it to be included on a new product, despite demand from the marketplace [3M 2001, 
GAO 1999]. 
Department of the Army (DA) Pam 70-3, Research, Development, and 
Acquisition -- Army Acquisition Procedures section 2.7 -- Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) (Science and Technology Development, 
Demonstration, and Transition Information), Procedures paragraph, subparagraph 3—
Advanced Technology Demonstration should be revised to read “not only speed 
maturation of technology, but ensure perspective technologies support the receiving 
program and constitute low risk in adoption.”  The result of adopting immature 
technology, as is the case with OICW, is that the OICW Program Manager must not only 
manage the integration of several technologies that make up the OICW, but must also 
manage the technology development itself.  In order to maximize the probability of 
program success, the acquisition community should provide PMs with disciplined 
processes, readily available information, readiness standards, and authority to ensure 
technology is sufficiently mature for critical combat systems and products.  This support 
would allow managers to safeguard product development from undue technology risks.     
Revise Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5000.1; The Defense 
Acquisition System, section 4.2.1. -- The Fundamental Role of the DoD Science and 
Technology (S&T) Program to augment the responsibility of the science and technology 
developer to render technologically mature, low risk alternatives for inclusion in 
acquisition programs.   This would allow promising technologies to remain in the S&T 
structure until a promising technology meets TRL 7 or 8 for inclusion into a prototype for 
testing.  This would allow the Program Manager to focus on integration and program 





includes people from research and development, marketing, manufacturing, and other 
functions that transfer with the new technology and ensure it is integrated into the new 
product.   
C. SUMMARY 
In government acquisition, program managers are induced to incorporate 
immature technologies that offer significant performance gains. These pressures come 
from the user's perception of the threat, technologists that see the program as an 
opportunity to apply a new technology, and funding competition that rewards weapon 
systems with unique features.  An environment that matures technology to achieve 
product readiness before it is constrained by the regulation of an acquisition program is 
required in this case.  In successful programs, an environment provided by S&T 
organizations or a team of S&T and product developers, managed technologies to high 
readiness levels before they were included in an acquisition program. These organizations 
provided an environment more conducive to the ups and downs normally associated with 





















SUGGESTED FURTHER STUDIES 
The following areas should be investigated for potential benefit to the DoD: 
The OICW program transitioned from a Science and Technology development 
program to an acquisition program before the criteria of the advanced technology 
demonstration could be attained.  There is some evidence that the acquisition community 
pushes a program ahead in order to gain greater funding to accelerate technology 
maturation.  An analysis of funding science and technology objectives in the armed 
services is required.  Specifically, how science and technology efforts are funded to 
mature technology before incorporation into acquisition programs. 
The prototype OICW fire control housing was manufactured from beryllium, a 
lightweight, yet toxic and expensive material.  The system developers used this approach 
to reduce system weight and maintain strength and ruggedness.  A study to evaluate and 
recommend potential alternatives to materials reducing weight and production costs is 























APPENDIX A--QUESTIONS POSED 
These questions were posed to members of the acquisition team involved with the 
OICW program in both the Government and commercial sector. 
• Why did the OICW transition to an acquisition program even though ATD 
exit criteria were not met? 
• What did the ATD prove? 
• What matches were made between technology and requirements at 
program start? 
• What are the factors of a 14-pound weight requirement? 
• Who was on the test and evaluation IPT during the ATD? 
• What recommendations do you have for the program to succeed? 
• Were there emerging results the SER did not address that show promise 
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